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Natalia SYTNYK

THE SHAKESPEAREAN VOCATIVE AS GRAMMATICAL METAPHOR

У статті аналізується значення вокативних конструкцій у роботах Шекспіра. Досліджується їх функціональний потенціал як маркерів міжособистісного та текстуального. Вивчення вокативних конструкцій важливе для розуміння того, як герої Шекспіра конструюють свої емоції, відносини, ставлення, статус та визначають, як і де вони позиціонують один одного та як вони створюють текстуальну інформацію.

Ключові слова: вокативна конструкція, маркер, метафора, текстуальна інформація.

The article analyzes the meaning of vocative constructions in Shakespeare's works. Their functional potential as markers of interpersonal and textual are investigated. Research into vocative constructions is important for understanding the way Shakespeare's characters construe their emotions, relationships, attitudes, status and identify in what capacity and where they position each other and how they create textual information.

Key words: vocative construction, marker, metaphor, textual information.

The concept of metaphor is most familiar to us from rhetorical approaches to language, which also enjoyed a high reputation among classical rhetoricians in Shakespeare's time [7, 18]. Well-developed communication skills and the celebration of eloquence are also at the core of the humanist syllabus, so that Shakespeare's contemporaries, and probably Shakespeare himself, were able to draw on a vast amount of resources of rhetoric.

The amplification and variation of any thought or expression within language contains the use of a number of figures of speech, to which the concept of metaphor can be generally applied. Halliday defines *metaphor* as a "verbal transference of various kinds." The term *metaphor* is also more specifically applied as "a word [that] is used for something resembling that which it usually refers to" [5, 340].

As such, it is opposed to concepts, such as *metonymy* (a word is used for something related to that which it usually refers to) and *synecdoche* (a word is used for some larger whole of which that which it refers to) [5, 341]. Certainly, the semantics of basically all vocative constituents may be "metaphorical" in character. Mention should only be made of some obvious references, such as Laertes's address to Ophelia as "O Rose of May" (*Ham*. 4.5.158), "Dear maid" (*Ham*. 4.5.159), "kind sister" (*Ham*. 4.5.159), and "sweet Ophelia" (*Ham*. 4.5.159), or Tamora's seducing vocative for Aaron "Ah, my sweet Moor, sweeter to me than life" (*Tit*. 2.3.51), and her disdaining address to Bassianus "Saucy controller of my private steps" (*Tit*. 2.3.60), or Hamlet's address to the ghost "old mole" (*Ham*. 1.5.162), and, fi nally, Lady Percy's bantering vocative to Hotspur as "you paraquito" (*1H4* 2.3.85).

The general concept of grammatical metaphor, especially that of the experiential grammatical, but also the interpersonal metaphor is vital to an understanding of the vocatives' interpersonal, experiential, and textual function, even though, so far, it has not been applied to the analysis of vocatives. Certainly, to fully grasp the conception of both lexical and grammatical metaphor it is advisable to approach an expression in relation to co(n)texts of culture and situation and not in absolute terms. A wording or an expression is metaphorical or congruent [5, 342] in relation to a diff erent way of expressing the meaning.

According to Halliday, it is not only possible to look at a particular wording in terms of lexical selection [5, 341]. A change of perspective from below, "a variation in the meaning of a given expression," to above, "as variation in the expression of a given meaning" [5, 342], enables us to investigate the function of different grammatical expressions that are nevertheless said to denote the same meanings. Halliday calls this phenomenon *grammatical metaphor*, since the focus of study is transferred to the variation in grammatical structure (even though the lexical metaphor can be seen as a subcategory of expressing the same meaning by different wordings).

In other words, the transformation within the semiotic mode corresponds with the general capacity of grammars as a stratifi ed system. It sets up categories and relationships, which have the effect of transforming experience into meaning. But while grammar has the power of constructing, it can also de-construe and re-construe along different lines. Stratification involves mapping meanings into forms (that is processes into verbal and participants into nominal structures), and it also allows a re-mapping of, for example, processes into nominal forms. Experience has been re-transformed and undergone a process of grammatical metaphor.

Halliday replaces the juxtaposed lexical terminology of literal and metaphorical by the more use- and context-bound defi nition of metaphorical and congruent. The epithet *congruent* denotes a way of expressing the meaning that is intuitively closer or more natural to the events in the world, respective of context of culture and situation [5, 343]. Therefore, the terms *congruent language* do not refer to a wording that is understood to be stylistically or socially more degenerate or normative in comparison to metaphorical language: both forms are simply performing different functions, as many factors influence the choice of metaphorical language in different contexts.

As such, the concepts of both lexical and grammatical metaphor should not be confused with norm and deviation or marked/unmarked paradigms, as both terms congruent and metaphorical do not initially include any stylistic value judgements [5, 345]. Thus, grammatical metaphor can be defined as the expression of a meaning through a lexico-grammatical form which originally evolved to express a different kind of meaning. The expression of the meaning is metaphorical in relation to a different way of expressing the 'same' meaning which would be more congruent.

Halliday succinctly theorises the idea in some other words as well: "same signified, different signifier" [5, 197]. Metaphor can be seen as another original and natural means of construing the multifunctionality and flexibility inherent in language. A linguistic element, for example a word or a grammatical structure, serves a particular function and is then extended to other related uses. Metaphorical modes of representation develop among congruent ones. For example, in English, nouns congruently encode things, while verbs congruently encode happenings. If this congruent usage is reversed, we may talk about metaphorical language as a re-mapping of the semantics onto the lexico-grammar.

What effect does this reconstrual have on the construction of discourse and what is the extent to which the concept of grammatical metaphor is applicable to the analysis of vocatives? The line of argumentation made in this study that the vocative can be seen as an experiential grammatical metaphor is strongly correlated to an assumption, which argues that vocatives should be investigated within the structural potential of the nominal group. The nominal group organises a large quantity of lexical information into functional configurations by the device which Poynton describes as amplification or Halliday as modification: "[t]he semantic principle of this expansion, and its signifi cance for discourse, is that it locates the participating entity along certain parameters ranging from the most instantial to the most systemic" [8, 28]. For Halliday, nominalisation is one type of experiential grammatical metaphor, because the nominal mode of expression is a metaphoric transfer of a clause, hence of a process and participants.

The experience has been retransformed and undergone a process of metaphor. What varies are not the lexical items, but the grammatical categories, "thus, grammatical metaphor, like metaphor in its traditional, lexical sense, is a realignment between a pair of strata: a remapping of the semantics on to the lexicogrammar" [5, 192].

So far, Shakespeare studies have not highlighted the fact that the concept of grammatical metaphor is applicable to vocatives *because* these are realised as nominal groups and may be seen as rewordings of more congruent clauses. However, the significance this point of view will have for the qualitative status of vocatives is enormous, as the concept helps not only understand the vocative's functional quality and eff ectiveness within dialogue as interaction, but might also convince the remaining sceptics that vocatives function within the experiential metafunction. It is possible to discern the underlying congruent structure of a vocative as well as to interpret the suggestions of a congruent rewording for the functional quality of the vocative. At the same time, this notion, in a way, is systematically related to the context and to discursive processes.

Albany attacks Goneril with "Tigers, not daughters, what have you performed" (*Lr*. 4.2.40). Leaving aside the position of the vocative and the accompanying clause and speech move for the moment, one could reword the vocative *tigers, not daughters* by an identifying relational clause "You are tigers, not daughters," where *tigers* and *daughters* are the value. It could also be expanded, as a conversion, along the lines of "you tigered your father," or, as a derivation, "you are tigered" echoing such complex Shakespearean wordformations as "he childed as I fathered" (*Lr*. 3.6.110).

As such, when a figure, which can be assumed to be congruently a clause, is reworded as a nominal group, much of the semantic information may become hidden or condensed in the NG. The underlying congruent clausal structure is also evanescent in vocatives, such as *my lord* or *lady*, which are oft en referred to as "titles of respect" [6] that indicate a static social relationship between speaker and hearer. The unpacking of forms such as these into relational processes of the identifying kind "you are my lord" or "you are my lady" illustrate that the meanings are different from simple reference to static power relations.

At the moment of utterance they are much more than that because the addresser uses this term in order a) to say something about the hearer on the experiential level, and b), on the interpersonal strata, to characterise the relationship between speaker and addressee within this co(n)text, as well as c) to establish the addressee's dynamic social identity.

In *Ant.* 2.2, Lepidus's "Noble Antony, / Not sickness should detain me" (*Ant.* 2.2.169) has been used to illustrate that some vocatives in Shakespeare do not ostensibly correlate with any constituents in the clause. Also via recourse to the concept of grammatical metaphor and its application to the vocatives we come round to the view that vocatives will never be freestanding, but rather always co(n)textual and co-referential. As each more congruent clause may unload a vocative, the experiential and, hence, the interpersonal and textual dimensions of Shakespearean vocatives are opened up more clearly.

The vocative can be unpacked by an identifying clause such as "you are a noble Antony" or "Antony is noble." Additionally, another way of proceeding even off ers a co-referential relationship between the vocative and a constituent

within the clause. There is a tendency for an implicit constituent that complements the verb *detain* and also suggests itself as relevant when reading the clause. One might tentatively argue that what Lepidus means to say is that due to Antony's noble character, even *sickness* could not withhold Lepidus from Antony.

Hence the prepositional phrase, spelled in italics, may serve as implicit confirmation criteria for the constant correlation of vocatives with elements in the clause, even though these are not initially legible and rather represent borderline cases. The picture presented so far needs some more exemplifying material. In *Tmp.*, the subsequent vocative, used by Miranda to address her father, occurs: "If by your art, my dearest father, you have / Put the wild waters in this roar, allay them" (*Tmp*. 1.2.1f.).

Certainly, the vocative could be unpacked by a relational clause "you are my dearest father." And yet, since a reworded clause that contains the verb *father* may again echo Edgar's "He childed as I fathered" in *Lr*. 3.6.110, it is possible to unpack the vocative by the following more congruent clause: "you fathered me dearly." Again, leaving aside position of vocative and accompanying speech moves, one can argue that this intertextual link enhances the meaning of the congruent rewording of the vocative, not only within its co-text, but also within its context: so far Prospero has represented for Miranda the most important and only person she could relate to. Yet, as she intends to prevent him from further exposing the others to the storm, she is in need of this bombastic reference to their filial alliance. Therefore, the meaning of the noun *father* in the vocative is complemented by its derivation or conversion, the verb *fathered* in the congruent clause. Adding to this is that both readings add, capture, and construe experiential and interpersonal meanings of *father* with their reference to the *term of family relationship*.

Having established the fact that the vocative in Shakespeare may be rephrased as a clause, one may now ask what eff ects this metaphorical transfer contain, as, for example, in nominalisations the processes are objectifi ed, as the doers of the process are oft en reduced. Therefore, it is important to describe in detail what happens grammatically in the deconstructing process, and inquire what it is that is reduced and condensed. Within this framework another factor is also worth stressing: Halliday points out that the nominal group of a nominalised process can represent another participant in the clause [4, 197].

Even though this observation has to be slightly modified for the role of the vocative, as vocatives in Shakespeare may serve as participants in the clause, and, they are co-referential with other participants in the clause, the notion of participation and condensation are crucial to an understanding of the vocatives' force in Shakespeare.

It is additionally necessary to look in more detail at the co-representational interplay that exists between the metaphorical and the congruent wordings of vocatives, which has already been alluded to in the example from *Tmp*. This relationship is essential in order to understand the functional, experiential, and interpersonal quality of the vocative, both as a nominal group and within the clause. Beyond the clause, the vocative as a grammatical metaphor opens up a changed, though also complementary viewpoint to the approaches taken within and below the clause.

If we assume that a vocative can be congruently construed as a clause and hence reworded metaphorically by a nominal group, a considerable amount of energy is released. Due to its semogenic power, the NG can be lexically expanded to a more or less indefinite extent. It can organise a large quantity of lexical material into functional confi guration in which "lexical items operate either directly (as words) or indirectly (through rankshift ed phrases or clauses)" [4, 168]. This phenomenon is called "incapsulation," one of the two important functions of nominalisation.

If we assume that, as has been illustrated above, a process has been rankshifted into a nominal group (that grammatically works as a vocative), this metaphoric shift constitutes another essential prerequisite for the inclusion of vocatives within the experiential metafunction, because it creates experience into wordings. Hence, the experiential function of Shakespeare's vocatives, which so far has been excluded from all studies of vocatives, is crucial, not only in respect to the grammar of vocatives in the clause and its co-referential status, but also in relation to seeing the vocative as a NG and vocative categorisations.

Th e NG-structure then opens up the potential for taxonomising and functions as anchoring points for the figure in which they occur. Hence, the transformation of experience into meaning and the re-mapping of semantics onto the lexical grammar creating the flux of experience into confi gurations of semantic categories have a value in people's theory of living environment and meaning. The means of packaging compacting, condensing, and destillation [5, 200] is crucial to the interpersonal and experiential dimensions of discourse in Shakespeare. Seeing vocatives as grammatical metaphor is not only a rewording, but also a resemanticising of meanings that historically, dramatically, and functionally, brings into being a new ideology of vocative usage.

Cleopatra's "Excellent falsehood" (*Ant*. 1.1.40), for example, might be interpreted as a realisation of how the whole world is contrived into deceit or how Antony resorts to lies and distrust, and, at the same time, it functions as a characterisation of Antony's allegedly deceitful behaviour. Notice the way in which Cleopatra's outburst distils and hence somehow statically positions Antony by the abstraction *Excellent falsehood*. He is hit by a verbal arrow, and, as Adamson has put it, also by the surprise and the force of the new thought; just because it is structurally enwrapped in the NG and vocative manner. Adamson particularly refers to the high rhetorical potential of NGs for eloquence and the Early Modern appreciative attitude to this kind of rhetorical force [1, 546].

In relation to a vocative that may be preceded by a definite article, mention is made of Hal's "Farewell, the later spring! Farewell, All-hallown summer" (*1H4* 1.2.158). As said, the difference between the use of *my* or *the* as deictic elements attributes a more distinct and momentary *experiential* value to Falstaff . This is, however, dialectically

dependent upon the interpersonal choice of the vocative as an interpersonal element as such. The condensed information about Falstaff's social identity at the moment of Hal's farewell needs explicit explanation, as it constitutes both a lexical and a grammatical metaphor.

When Hal characterises Falstaff or Falstaff 's condition as the Indian summer of old age, he is experientially characterised as such, but, interpersonally, one needs to question whether his address only adds to the general comic and jovial tone of the scene and thus serves as a form of banter, in which Falstaff lovingly ridicules Falstaff's alleged manly vivacity and sexual, criminal, unconventional energy, or whether it is to serve as a more sarcastic means of foreshadowing Hal's detachment from Falstaff in *2H4*.

In relation to the confines of the theatre and the fact that content and interpersonal relations were only transferred by means of spoken language, the vocative must be seen as both an interpersonally, experiential, and rhetorically potent means of transferring both content and attitude, and relations. As such, the vocative's pragmatic capacity for framing the speech function of the utterance it accompanies seems to be a logic consequence. This may result from the semantic ties it establishes to constituents in the clause. Here, the force of the vocative as realised by a nominal group and as a grammatical metaphor has even further enlightened this capacity. When, for example, Lady Capulet learns about Romeo's murder of Tybalt, she authoritatively and pleadingly turns to the prince and demands: "Prince, as thou art true, / For blood of ours, shed blood of Montague" (*Rom*. 3.1.148f.). Despite the textual force of this vocative as a speaker-selector and its non-amplifi ed form, the initial position of the vocative and the briefness of the address that goes along with it, not only bespeak of the intensity of her demand, but also almost turn it into a threat.

These modifications substantially broaden former approaches, and, at the same time, point to the difficulties in incorporating the vocatives into a grammatical system, and to the vocative's peripheral treatment. NG-composition causes the fairly static, non-negotiable, and objectified appearance of the vocative. The vocative as a NG is non-finite or "thingified," as the thing in the NG represents the nucleus of the NG and the other elements are ordered around it. Hence, the vocative that is realised as a NG structure creates a universe of things, bounded, stable and determinate. Toolan also alludes to the idea of NGs serving as a grammatical metaphor when he argues that even though most nouns represent things, "stable or inactive" [10, 150], there are some nouns and noun phrases that "directly entail an activity or verbal procedure. In a hidden way, they are clause-size activities re-packaged as isolated stable things" [10, 151].

If NGs are seen as a possibility of loading compact data into a clause or text, this observation, and the concept of nominalisation that lies behind it, must also have an additional functional potential for the interpretation of the Shakespearean vocative. This is especially so if we take into account that nominalisations and NGs are "also notoriously ideologically charged" [10, 186]. When Antony addresses Cleopatra with "Love, I am full of lead" (*Ant*. 3.11.72), the vocative could be seen as a nominalisation of the verb to *love*. One may ask why Antony does not express his love for her verbally and whether this vocative is strongly related to aspects of positioning of speaker and hearer within co(n)text and socially determined rules.

Again we can see the semantic ambiguity or, to put it differently, the deal of neutralisation that is achieved when a fi gure is reworded. *Love* might be the realisation of "I, Antony, love you, Cleopatra," but it might also be reworded into the clause "you, Cleopatra, love me, Antony," alluding to the authoritative force. In both versions, the process is both a mental process, but senser and beneficiary are changed.

The interpersonal grammatical analysis of the vocative alludes to concepts such as (non-) cooperation, pragmatic principles, speech act theory and Toolan's theory of speech moves. It shows the complex interplay between structure, form, and function. Vocatives in Shakespeare are foregrounded against an outer and inner textual norm and also via recourse to Grice's, and its maxims.

Vocatives in Shakespeare have, next to the experiential and the textual, specific interpersonal meanings. They function as social markers and, more ideologically orientated, construe a negotiation of social identities. In this complex endeavour, formal and functional, as well as quantitative and qualitative aspects are strongly interwoven, construed, and reflected.

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Andriy SYTNYK

AD HOC CONCEPTS AND EUPHEMISM TREADMILL:
A COGNITIVE-PRAGMATIC ACCOUNT

У статті аналізується прагматика евфемістичних ланцюгів з позицій когнітивно-прагматичної теорії релевантності. Робляться висновки щодо того, яким чином відбувається процес контамінації евфемізмів у дискурсі.

Ключові слова: прагматика, теорія релевантності, евфемізми, контамінація.

The article provides an analysis of euphemistic chains from the point of view of cognitive-pragmatic Relevance Theory. Conclusions are made regarding the way euphemisms become contaminated in discourse

Key words: pragmatics, relevance theory, euphemisms, contamination.

In the article euphemisms are analyzed in terms of ad-hoc concepts narrower in denotation than their lexically-encoded counterparts. I discuss whether lexicalization of such ad-hoc concepts is responsible for the taboo contamination of euphemisms.

According to Allan and Burridge [3], euphemisms are present in all known world languages and thus constitute a linguistic universal. This entails that most likely euphemistic strategies are natural abilities of human beings. If people in all known world cultures resort to euphemistic strategies, such strategies must be rooted in cognition and have to do with natural meaning-processing abilities, which cognitive pragmatics was designed to explain.

According to some researchers, the taboo-induced need for language change leads to a continuous turnover in vocabulary and as a result of this, linguistic innovations which are the products of this language change can be thought of as having 'careers' in the vernacular. Pinker [10] has characterized the career of a euphemism as a 'treadmill' that ultimately wears out the term when it becomes ubiquitous in text and discourse (cf. also Allan & Burridge [3]).

Similar observation is made by Allan & Burridge [4]: "(S)ome euphemisms are short-lived: time blows their cover. With the years they degenerate into dysphemisms through contamination by the taboo topic and they are then replaced. PC (politically correct, A.S.) language tramps the same treadmill…*African-American* now replaces *black* which earlier replaced *Negro* and *coloured*. And so it goes on; if society's prejudices continue to bubble away, the negative connotations soon reattach themselves" [4, 89].

Lexicographer Hugh Rawson [11] suggested that the career of a euphemism is limited by a linguistic incarnation of the economic principle known as Gresham's Law, whereby debased currency eventually drives full-value tokens out of circulation. Just as "bad money drives out the good" in a monetary system, Rawson argued that through frequent usage, euphemisms become tainted by their associations with distasteful topics. This process eventually drives them out of conversational circulation and leads to the creation of new euphemisms to replace them.

According to Senichkina [2, 128], in time euphemisms undergo 2 processes. They can either:

1) Become synonymous with the substituted units and thereby stop fulfilling their euphemistic function. Such euphemisms become direct nominations. Such changes take place due to social factors.

2) Contaminate their denotation as a result of linguistic factors. The nature of denotation of the tabooed linguistic unit determines the rate of euphemistic subtitutions. The more strictly tabooed a word or an expression is the sooner the contamination takes place.

B.A. Larin [1] discussed in his 1977 paper how taboo topics change historically and how different they are in various social groups. He argued that for euphemisms to enjoy a lasting career, it is important that they have a well-known dysphemistic counterpart in that vernacular. The loss of a rude or unacceptable equivalent drives the euphemism itself into the category of direct nominations and in that case a new substitute is required [1, 110]. Larin also noted that the more often a euphemism is used the quicker it loses its ameliorating capacity and the sooner it will require another euphemistic substitute for itself.

Euphemism turnover can indeed be quite high and as old euphemisms become taboo, new ones are invented to replace them. As this cycle continues it actually forces semantic change in the language [15]. Once a euphemism loses its euphemistic force and becomes a taboo term it is very rare for it to become acceptable again. While taboo may influence the loss of some lexical items, it also encourages the creation of euphemisms. By way of an example we can take the phrase 'juvenile delinquents' which from 1950s had been used to refer to adolescent criminals and recently was replaced by the allegedly improved value-free label 'conduct-disordered youth'. Similarly the dysphemistic 'crippled'