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MEDIA

początku XXI wieku

Logistyka i administrowanie w mediach Zarządzanie Big Data

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Modern Ukrainian Media Market

Współczesny ukraiński rynek mediów

Streszczenie

W artykule uwzględniono obecny stan rynku mediów na Ukrainie, jego strukturę i cechy.

Na podstawie badań przeprowadzonych przez Internews przy wsparciu ambasady USA i międzynarodowego instytutu socjologii w Kijowie w lutym 2018 r., których celem było ustalenie, z których źródeł ukraińcy otrzymują wiadomości: telewizja, media drukowane, serwisy informacyjne, sieci społecznościowe lub radio że głównym źródłem informacji dla większości ukraińców pozostaje telewizja.

Wyświetlono wyniki monitorowania organizacji publicznej "detektor media" głównych krajowych kanałów telewizyjnych (cztery główne telegramy – starlight media, media group ukraine, media 1+1, inter group, które są własnością wiktora pinczuka, rynata achmetowa, igora kołomojskiego, dmitrija firtasza i siergija lowoczkina, co stanowi 76 % widowni kanałów telewizyjnych).

W badaniu są szczegółowo opisane zasoby online na Ukrainie, zidentyfikowano 20 najważniejszych ukraińskich mediów internetowych, które ustalają, czy mają największy wpływ na porządek publiczny, ekspertyzy "detector media". Opublikowano kilka ocen "institute of mass media" (imm), które pomogą odbiorcom wybrać media, którym mogą zaufać.

Summary

The article deals with the modern state of media market in Ukraine, its structure and special features.

According to the studies conducted by Internews, with the assistance of the US Embassy and Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in February, 2018, the purpose of which was to find out which sources Ukrainians receive news from: television, printed media, news websites, social

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networking sites or radio, it was defined that the television still remains the main source information for the majority of Ukrainians.

We have presented the results of monitoring (conducted by public organization „Detector Media”) of four major telegroups (StarLightMedia, Media Group Ukraine, 1+1 Media, Inter Media Group, which belong to Viktor Pinchuk, Rynat Akhmetov, Igor Kolomoiskyi and Dmytro Firtash correspondingly), which account for 76% of the television channel audience,. The article also introduces the research of private media groups by Italian economist Giacomo Corneo, who created mathematical model of correlation between the creation of private monopolies and the influence on media objectivity.

Online media were characterized in details. There was also presented top 20 of Ukrainian online media, which have the biggest influence on social order, by expert rating of “Detector Media”. The article also shows a couple of ratings by Institute of Mass Media (IMI), which may help the recipients to choose trustworthy mass media.

Target setting

The means of mass communication play an important role in the development of Ukrainian society. The transition into the information society determines new perspectives for research and the search for ways to develop media industry in Ukraine. State information policy as an important component of Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy covers all the spheres of life and is aimed to ensure a smooth transition to a democratic information society and the full integration of Ukraine into the world’s information space. The task of the state policy in the development of various types of media in Ukraine is to create the necessary economic and socio-cultural conditions, legal and organizational mechanisms for the formation, development and ensuring the effective use of national information resources in all spheres of life and activities of a citizen, society and the state.

The information industry belongs to the strategic interests of any country and needs special attention. Its products are a significant element of the cultural life of society, satisfy its informational, scientific, educational and cultural needs, influence spirituality and cultural development. Therefore, it is relevant to conduct an analysis of the current state of the media market in Ukraine.

An overview of previous research results

Aspects of theoretical and practical issues of media activity under the conditions of today are covered in the scientific publications of such researchers as V. Ivanov, A. Lytvynenko, A. Moskalenko, G. Pocheptsov, S. Chukut, V. Badrak, G. Vartanov, V. Zdrovega, C. Kvit, O. Kopylenko, V. Kravchenko, I. Krupsky, O. Kuznetsova, V. Lyzanchuk, J. Los, E. Mamontov, I. Mashchenko, A. Meleschenko, I. Paslavsky, T. Petriv, V. Rizun , V. Shklyar and others. The research of such authors as S. Teleshun, V. Zhuravsky, S. Tomenko, devoted to the problems of improving the democratic society in Ukraine and E. Mamontova, who considers the role of the press in the processes of democratic transformations are worth attention. However, the main tasks of the state information policy in Ukraine need further research and development.

The purpose of the article


The purpose of the research is to study the modern Ukrainian media market, its structure and features as sources from which Ukrainians receive information (television, print media, radio, news websites, and social networking sites).

Presentation of the main research material

The review of the Ukrainian media market is based on official data of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine ⁴ [6], the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine ⁵ [7], studies by the Institute of Mass Media (IMI), the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the Internews organization with the assistance of the US Embassy ⁶ [15], and by other organizations interested in the study of the Ukrainian media market.

Analysis of statistical data shows that in the modern media market of Ukraine there are 128 TV channels (32 national, 64 regional and 32 local ones), 228 radio networks (16 national, 39 regional, 173 local radio stations), 3085 printed periodicals with a circulation of more than 66 million copies and more than 2000 online media ⁷ [15] (Figure 1).

Figure 1. The structure of modern mass media market of Ukraine



According to a U-Media study conducted during 2015-2018 by Internews, with the assistance of the US Embassy, the purpose of which was to find out which sources Ukrainians receive news from: television, print media, news websites, social networking sites or radio – the main source information for the majority of Ukrainians still remains television. In 2018, the proportion of respond-

⁴ *Derzhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrainy*. URL: <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua>


⁵ *Derzhavnyi komitet telebachennia i radiomovlennia Ukrainy*. URL: <http://comin.kmu.gov.ua>

⁶ *Media consumption survey in Ukraine 2018*. URL: https://www.internews.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/2018-MediaConsumSurvey_eng_FIN.pdf

⁷ *Ibid.*

ents who used television as a news source was 74 %. The second place is online media, with 57 % of the respondents. Social networking sites get 53 %) ⁸ [15] (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Weekly consumption of mass media as the source of news by Ukrainians during 2015-2018 [14]



Which sources do ukrainians receive news from?

Kiev International Institute of Sociology hold the similar survey in the February 2018. The results were almost the same. Almost 86 % of Ukrainians trust national TV. On the second and third place are online media and social networking sites (27 and 24 % respectively) ⁹ [19].

Manuel Castells, a sociologist and developer of the theory of information (network) society in his work “Communication power” ¹⁰ [4, 5], noted that the most important source of influence today is the transformation of human consciousness. And the media itself, as the main provider of messages and symbols, has the greatest influence on people’s consciousness. This is actively used by politicians and oligarchs around the world. Ukraine is no exception. However, in the absence of powerful, popular alternative sources of information, such as public broadcasting, the country’s main TV channels often form an irrelevant picture of reality.

Interpretation of events becomes more important than the event itself, by formatting a society’s presentation of this event or person. Channel owners are constantly abusing media power in defending their business and political interests, imposing a corresponding vision of events and processes, and society has not yet learned to resist this.

In three years, from 2014 to 2017, there have been serious changes in the state media market: in fact, the state has waived ownership of the media. After the adoption of the Law “On Public Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine” in 2014, the state-owned NTCU (with all affiliates) was transformed into a public broadcaster. Also in 2015, the Law “On the Reform of State and Communal Print Media” was adopted. This Law envisages the denationalization of this type of media.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Opposition to Russian propaganda and media literacy: results of all-ukrainian opinion poll [Online]. // NGO “Detector Media”. 2018. URL: https://detector.media/doc/images/news/archive/2016/136017/DM_KMIS_engl__WEB-2.pdf

¹⁰ Castells M. *Communication Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 571 p Castells M. *Vlast` komunikacii* : Moskva: Izd. dom Vy`sshej shkoly` e`konomiki, 2017, 591 p.

Today, there are four major telegroups – StarLightMedia, Media Group Ukraine, 1+1 Media, Inter Media Group. They belong to Viktor Pinchuk, Rynat Akhmetov, Igor Kolomoiskyi and Dmytro Firtash correspondingly. These 4 telegroups account for 76 % of the television channel audience¹¹ [16]. In addition, we cannot help mentioning a few TV channels that in some way or another influence the political discourse in the country. These are the “Channel 5”, owned by the current President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko; “112 Ukraine”, which did not reveal the name of the final beneficiary, and therefore there is a lot of talk about who it belongs to.


Hromadske TV and Hromadske Radio do not fit into this system as they are recently created by journalists and supported by Western donors. However, they are not powerful enough to compete with the oligarchic media.

Italian economist Giacomo Corneo, having analysed private mediagroups, created mathematical model to find out how creation of private monopolies and concentration of wealth in hands of some groups of society can influence objectivity of media. He concluded that, in other equal conditions, increasing the concentration of property in the country makes media more biased and corrupt¹² [14].

The leading world mass media – such as CNN, Bloomberg, FoxNews, FT – belong to business. Therefore, they are profitable and make money. In Ukraine, we have opposite situation. During the recent years, all four telegroups operate at a loss, therefore politicians and authorities often use the possibility of influencing society through TV channels.

The public organization “Detector Media” regularly keeps an eye on the main national TV channels and detects news stories that violate journalistic standards on almost all “central” TV channels (Figure 3).¹³

Figure 3. Total number of materials during 2014-2017 with violations of professional standards, which may indicate signs of promotion (or censorship) [13]



¹¹ Media ownership matters [Online]. // Institute of Mass Information. 2017. URL: <https://ukraine.mom-rsf.org/en/>.
¹² Media Capture in a Democracy: The Role of Wealth Concentration. URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=667326
¹³ Main trends in media coverage of sociopolitical processes in Ukraine in IN 2014-2017. Kyiv : NGO “Detector Media”, 2017. URL: https://ms.detector.media/content/files/dm_ukraine_news_2014-17_internet-compressed.pdf

Monitorings of public organisation “Detector media” during 2014-2017 show the following tendencies:

1. In 2013, before the events on Maidan, the state’s “First National” was the biggest violator of professional standards. Experts found the largest number of materials with signs of “jeans”, meaning infomercial (“For Ukrainian journalists, “jeans” is not just a pair of denim pants, but also a media piece published for a payment without any mention of the latter. It’s simple: you pay, they publish – this is jeans”¹⁴ [24] –on this channel. The best indicators were demonstrated by Channel 5, which, as it is today, belonged to Petro Poroshenko¹⁵ [1].

2. The greatest violations of professional standards were recorded during periods of high political activity. These periods were:

- January 2014: During this period, shootings took place on the Independence Square in Kyiv during the Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan Revolution). The Verkhovna Rada, with gross violations of the regulations, adopted dictatorship laws, known as “anti-protest laws”, which restricted freedom of speech, introduced such notions as “foreign agent”, “extremist activity”, etc.
- October 2014: because the snap election of the Verkhovna Rada took place on 26 October 2014, there increased the number of biased articles and journalistic stories (“jeans”), which hype certain political parties or individual politicians.
- October 2015: local elections took place in the country.
- February 2017 is the exception to the rules, since this month there were no particularly active political events, but TV channels owned by representatives of the Viktor Yanukovich’s political team, actively “hyped” the issue of Dysfunctional Parliament, sensitizing the society to possible spin elections.

3. The leaders of anti-rating (that is, the biggest violators of standards) during the specified period are TV channels owned by former supporters of Viktor Yanukovich, they are “Inter” and “Ukraina”. During the protests on the Maidan, “First National” TV Channel also was on the top or this anti-rating, but with the beginning of its transformation into a public broadcaster, after the change of power in 2014, this channel became almost free of biased news.

4. Most of the manipulations and violations concerned the coverage of protests on the Maidan in 2014. “First National” (state channel), “Inter” (owners are Dmitry Firtash and Serhiy Lvovchkin), “Ukraina” (the owner is Rinat Akhmetov) gave biased information in favor of then-government and the President Viktor Yanukovich, which caused certain disbalance. However, “1+1” (the owner is Igor Kolomoisky), “Channel 5” (the owner is Petro Poroshenko) openly supported the positions of the protesters, so the disbalance here was going on the other side. Although, the disbalance of news on pro-government TV channels was greater¹⁶ [12, 22]. Such editorial policies of these TV channels completely correlated with the political position of their owners. Dmitry Firtash, Sergei

¹⁴ Ukraine’s deep-rooted media problem [Online]. // Columbia Journalism Review. URL: https://archives.cjr.org/behind_the_news/ukraines_deep-rooted_media_pro.php

¹⁵ 5 kanal lidyruie u dotrymanni profesiynikh standartiv u novynakh [Online]. // MediaSapiens. 2013. URL: http://www.osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/daily_news/5_kanal_lidirue_u_dotrimanni_profesiynikh_standartiv_u_novynakh

¹⁶ Kreshhenie ognem». Glavny`m propagandistom vlasti stanovitsya «Inter» [Online]. // MediaSapiens. 2014. URL: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/daily_news/kreschenie_ognem_glavnym_propagandistom_vlasti_stanovitsya_inter. Pro shho movchali novini u sichni-2014. [Online]. // MediaSapiens. 2014 URL: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/daily_news/pro_scho_movchali_novini_v_sichni2014/

Lvochkin, Rinat Akhmetov – all of them came from the team of Viktor Yanukovich, while Igor Kolomoisky and Poroshenko were in opposition to him.

5. The rhetoric of “First National”, “Inter” and “Ukraine” has changed to neutral just in a few days after Yanukovich’s escape from the country and the assignment of Olexander Turchinov to the position of interim President. This only reaffirms the thesis about the ability of political elites (including the media oligarchs) to blend in and quickly adapt to the political situation for survival ¹⁷ [10].

6. An analysis of the news in 2014 showed that TV channels, while covering the presidential elections, practically did not use “jeans” in their favor, however, showed committal to Petro Poroshenko ¹⁸ [23].

7. With the onset of the annexation of the Crimea, Ukrainian channels unconsciously played along with Russian propaganda, naming the Russian military as «unknown», then «green men», or “self-defence of Crimea”, in effect using manipulative terms imposed by Russia.

8. With the onset of the deployment of events in the east, the TV channels repeated the mistakes of presenting information about the annexation of the Crimea, using neutral terminology about separatists. Powerful criticism of power in general, and at the same time, absolutely uncritical coverage of the activities of President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Groisman in particular, became trends of 2016-2017 ¹⁹ [21, 25]. This gives reasons to believe in the probability of the agreement of these individuals with large media owners in exchange for certain preferences.

9. Since 2014, TV channel owners had used news broadcasts for settling the score with political opponents or business competitors.

Particularly significant was the ‘war’ between the Firtash/Levochkin and Kolomoisky groups, who sorted out the relationship directly in the news broadcasts of their TV channels, because of the conflict around the company “Ukrtransnafta” and the bank “Privat” ²⁰ [8, 9].

10. After the introduction of the ban of Russian TV channels, Ukrainian TV channels frequently become broadcasters of the mass messages of Russian propaganda. Inter hold a leading position here. The pro-Russian position is most apparent in the coverage of topics related to decommunization, events in the Donbass area and the position of Russia. Thus, “Inter” broadcasted most of pro-Russian mass messages about the damage of the economic blockade of the Donbas. In addition, the channel is conducting a targeted campaign (as well as Russian media) regarding

¹⁷ Kanaly Yanukovicha nadeli budenovku tolko posle begstva svoego patron [Online]. // MediaSapiens. 2014. URL: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/daily_news/vlast_menyaetsya_kanal_yanukovicha_nadeli_budenovku_tolko_posle_begstva_svoego_patrona

¹⁸ Telekanali bil'she simpatizovali Poroshenku. [Online]. // MediaSapiens. 2014. URL: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/daily_news/telekanali_bil'she_simpatizovali_poroshenku

¹⁹ Poroshenko stav zirkoyu «parketu». *Monitoring telenovin za 6–11 bereznya 2017 roku* [Online]. // MediaSapiens. 2014. URL: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/daily_news/poroshenko_stav_zirkoyu_parketu_monitoring_telenovin_za_611_bereznya_2017_roku/Zubchenko_Y_Grojsman_us_omu_golova_yak_zvit_uryadu_pere tvorivsy_a_na_piar_prem'cr-ministra [Online]. // MediaSapiens. 2017. URL: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/monitoring_overview/grojsman_usomu_golova_yak_zvit_uryadu_peretvorivsy_a_na_reklamu_premierministra/

²⁰ Dovzhenko, O., & Andrejcziv, I. Borot'ba za “Ukrtransnaftu” v novinax: matyuki, psevdonimi ta zaslugi pered Vitchiznoyu [Online]. // MediaSapiens. 2014. URL: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/daily_news/borotba_za_ukrtransnaftu_v_novinakh_matyuki_psevdonimi_ta_zaslugi_pered_vitchiznoyu. Dovzhenko, O., Zdavalosya b, do chogo tut Kolomojs'kij? [Online]. // MediaSapiens. URL: https://ms.detector.media/monitoring/daily_news/zdavalosya_b_do_chogo_tut_kolomoyskiy/

the accusations of the Ukrainian government in corruption, while slurring the corruption in Putin's environment or in the Channel's management ²¹ [2, 3].

The monitoring carried out by the experts of the public organization "Detector Media" shows a clear correlation between the interests of large media-oligarchs and the editorial policy that their channels conduct ²² [13, 20].

But nationwide television, there exist more than 140 regional TV channels in Ukraine. MediaLab Online created an online map of property of regional media ²³ [11], where you can find a list of media, their type and surnames of individuals who affect each particular media in each region of Ukraine.

The market of online informational resources is not regulated in Ukraine. Websites are not considered to be mass media and are not registered as such. Legally, they are not required to open to general public their contact details and/or detail about their owners.

There exist almost 2,000 websites where news can be read in Ukraine. The number of online media, which find exclusive news and generate their own content, is much smaller (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Top 20 Ukrainian online media, which influence the society most (regarding to the research by "Detector Media") [17]



Some of these websites belong to business groups that also own TV channels. According to a study by "Reporters Without Borders" and the Institute of Mass Information from 2017, the top 4 owners of the Internet media occupy an audience of 17.56 %. Three of the four major Internet media owners in Ukraine are the media groups: Media Group Ukraine (3.15 %), 1+1 media (4.25 %) and UMH (7.49 %), which owns numerous Internet media. The fourth, Obozrevatel (2.67 %), belongs

²¹ Burkovskiy, P. "Inter" bizhyt poperedu rosiyskikh "parotiahiv" [Online]. // MediaSapiens. 2017. URL: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/advocacy_and_influence/inter_bizhit_poperedu_rosiyskikh_parotyagiv. Burkovskiy, P. "Inter" zmahaietsia za zvannia "p'iatoi kolony" [Online]. // MediaSapiens 2017. URL: http://www.osvita.mediasapiens.ua/monitoring/advocacy_and_influence/inter_zmagaetsya_za_zvannya_pyatoi_koloni

²² Main trends in media coverage of sociopolitical processes in Ukraine in IN 2014-2017. Kyiv : NGO "Detector Media", 2017. URL: https://ms.detector.media/content/files/dm_ukraine_news_2014-17_internet-compressed.pdf. Osnovni tendentsiie mediavystvleni suspilno-polityshchnyh protsesiv v Ukraini u 2014-2017 rr.. Kyiv : NGO "Detector Media", 2017. URL: https://ms.detector.media/content/files/dm_news_2014-17_internet-compressed.pdf.

²³ Karta mediavlasnosti Ukrainy [online]. [Online]. // MediaLab.Onlie. URL: <http://www.map.medialab.online/?open=3>

to the Brodsky family. However, among the top twenty websites there are also some media, which are independent from big business and politics, such as *Ukrainska Pravda*, *Liga*, and *RBC* ²⁴ [16].

Experts from the Institute of Mass Media have investigated how transparent Ukrainian Internet media sources are and how open information about their owners, chief editors and just contact details of the editorial office is. The survey covered the top 50 mass media websites in Ukraine. According to the results of this research, the analysed Internet media depending on the owner's identity can be divided into the following groups:

- 14 media, which can be called Ukrainian media business. This means that they are owned by Ukrainian journalists ("*Obozrevatel*", "*Liga*", *RBC*, "*Interfax*", "*Fakty*", "*Gordon*", "*Ukrainska Pravda*", "*Tsensor*", "*Glavkom*", "*Express*", "*Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*", "*Khvyliya*", "*Gromadske TV*", *UNN*);

- 12 media owned by existing or former politicians, politicians' assistants and media oligarchs (Today, *ZIK*, *TSN*, *Channel 24*, *UNIAN*, *New1*, *Zakhid.net*, *Podrobytsi*, *Vesti*, *Ukrainian News*, *ICTV*, *Gazeta.ua*);

- 6 media owned by Ukrainian residents whose names are unknown to the general public, and the assessment of their affiliation requires a separate study (*Telegraph*, *Facenews*, *Slovo i dilo*, *Bagnet.org*, *Focus.ua*, *Enovosty.com*);

- 7 media, the final beneficiary of which is non-resident (*Novoe vremia*, *Znai.ua*, *112*, *Politeka*, *KP in Ukraine*, *Correspondent*, *Country*);

- 6 state media (*Ukrinform* (Ukraine), *Radio Svoboda* (USA). This category also includes four state Russian media, which are among the top 50 most popular websites in Ukraine (*Lenta.ru*, *Vesti.ru*, *КП.py*, *РИА.py*);

- 5 mass media, the final beneficiaries of which are unknown: *Comments.ua*, *Bykvy.com*, *From-ua*, *Hronika.info*, *apostrophe.ua*

Some relevant organizations keep track of these online media for compliance with journalistic standards. These organisations are:

- The Public Organization *Detector Media* has a section "Monitoring" on the website ²⁵ [18] with the overlooks of talk shows, TV shows and journalistic stories.

- The Institute of Mass Information (IMI) ²⁶ [16] has several ratings that help to select the media that can be trusted. The IMI also does research on the sticking to journalistic standards by Ukrainian media. Experts analyse news and articles for authenticity, the balance of points of views and the separation of facts from the comments.

The monitorings of the main national TV channels, which are carried out regularly by the "Detector Media", prove that private TV channels put the interests of their owners in the first place. This leads to a distorted representation of reality. This, in combination with a deterioration in quality of news, has led to a significant decline of confidence to the central Ukrainian TV channels in recent years, as confirmed by various sociological studies. Thus, according to the results of a poll conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation named after Ilko Kucheriv, the dynamics of confidence to the Ukrainian media is negative, there has been a fall: from + 26 % in 2010 to + 2 % in 2015. Obviously, in the context of the aggressive informational space in which Ukraine has been in recent years, and with the dominance of oligarchic media on the market, there is a great need to accelerate the reform of the public broadcasting system. In parallel, media literacy should be actively promoted among various reaches of society. This should raise the society's demand

²⁴ *Media ownership matters* [Online]. // Institute of Mass Information. 2017. URL: <https://ukraine.mom-rsf.org/en/>.

²⁵ *Monitoring* [Online] // NGO «Detector Media». URL: <https://detector.media/category/monitoring>

²⁶ *Ibid.*

for fine content, thus encouraging TV channels to focus more on the needs of the audience, and not on the ones of their owners²⁷ [13, 20].

Conclusions

The analysis of media market conditions during the period from 2014 to 2017 shows that television media remain the leader in the media consumption structure, but its audience has decreased by almost 10 % (from 83 % to 74 %). The most popular TV channels still are “1 + 1” and “Inter”.

The audience of print media is constantly decreasing (from 25 % to 16 % over four years). The Internet media audience has considerably grown (from 44 % to 57 %) – this covers both news websites and social networking sites.

Almost all news channels are related to politicians or political forces. Recipients of the news should consider this if television is their main source of news.

Some part of the Internet media belongs to business groups that own TV channels, but there is also a large media groups independent from big business and politics, e.g. “Liga”, RBC, “Interfax”, “Fakty” “Gordon”, “Ukrainska Pravda”, “Tsensor”, “Glavkom”, “Express”, “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia”, “Khvyliya, Gromadske TV”, UNN.

The monitorings show a clear correlation between the interests of the major media-oligarchs and the editorial policy of their channels.

Promoting media literacy among various reaches of society is a key to the increase in community's demand for fine content, which would encourage media to focus more on the needs of the audience, rather than on the interests of their owners.

The reform of the information industry concerns not only the material security and maintenance support, but also the direct implementation of the adopted laws into life and rethinking the significance of the reform in public life. For modern Ukraine, the appropriate information policy in the field of mass media is the main means of developing civil society, the most important condition for a constructive dialogue between the authorities and the people, and means of ensuring national security.

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27 Ibid.

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