

THE SPEAKER'S INTENTION IN DISCOURSE

The present paper is focused on the ways of retaining the Speakers' intention from the SL into the TL. The objective of the investigation is twofold: (1) the study of the modal frame 'I think...' as one of the means of hedging and one of the means expressing the Speaker's intention and (2) and the ways of conveying this frame in the TL. Our assumption is that the frame is a matrix «The Speaker + The Speech Event [mental verb] + Complement of the Speech Event» predicting the actual components the sentence semantics. We have selected a specific construct "I think" which the school grammar can term as a predicate phrase, the text grammar – embedded sentence, the semantic grammar–modal frame (Kaltenböck, 2010), the speech act theory – an informative matrix, the discourse-analysis – a particle/connector/connective/conjunct, the functional semantics – a complex unit revealing a taxonomy of functions. We shall start with its intentional function (Fraser, 1996; 1999; 2010). The corpus analysis is based on «a 100 million word collection of samples of written and spoken language from a wide range of sources, designed to represent a wide cross-section of British English from the late twentieth century.» The BNC gives the following data of the frequency of «I think...» – the total use is 40971; the highest frequency is registered in the Spoken Register – 25825; the lowest is in the Academic Register – 845; in Fiction – 7006; in Newspaper – 1743; in Magazine – 1536; Non-academic – 1242; and in Miscellanies – 2773. We have selected 26 text fragments with the «attitudinal» frame «I think...» expressing an additional component of hedging and grouped them according to its position in the utterance: front, middle and final positions. The achievement of decoding the speaker's intention was gained due to employing the correlation of Lexical and Functional Semantics and the assumption that the hearer recognizes this intention based on the speaker and hearer's «mutual knowledge», see: Duranti (2015). To define overtness the notion of «mutual knowledge» was introduced by Steven Schiffer (1972), see also: Kecskes, Mey (2008). The speaker's knowledge involves constructing a model of the hearer's knowledge relevant to the given situational context; conversely, the hearer's knowledge includes constructing a model of the speaker's knowledge relevant to the given situational context.

We have demonstrated one way of interpreting the semantic structure of the phrase «I think» in the Spoken Discourse decoding the actualized Speaker' intention. Our next project is to determine the speaker's intention in the Academic Discourse in the Source Language and the Target language in the frame of the cross-cultural linguistics.

Key words: speaker's intention, hedging, modal frame, matrix, discourse.

Валерій Михайленко. НАМІР МОВЦЯ У ДИСКУРСІ

Стаття присвячена дослідженню шляхів збереження наміру мовця у процесі перекладу з мови оригіналу на мову перекладу. Мета дослідження подвійна: (1) вивчення модальної структури «Я думаю...» як засобу хеджування та засобів вираження наміру мовця; (2) встановлення способу передачі відповідного фрейму з мови оригіналу на мову перекладу. Наше припущення полягає в тому, що фрейм становить матрицю «Мовець+ Мовна Подія» [діслово мислення] + Завершення Мовної Події», яка передбачає актуалізацію певних компонентів семантики речення.

Ключові слова: інтенція мовця, деінтенсифікація, модальна рамка, матриця, дискурс.

Валерий Михайленко. НАМЕРЕНИЕ АВТОРА В ДИСКУРСЕ

Статья посвящена исследованию путей сохранения намерения говорящего у процессе перевода с языка оригинала на язык перевода. Цель исследования двоякая: (1) изучение модальной структуры «Я думаю ...» как средства хеджирования и средства выражения намерения говорящего; (2) установление способа передачи данного фрейма с языка оригинала на язык перевода. Наше предположение состоит в том, что фрейм представляет собой матрицу «Говорящий + Речевое Событие» [глагол мышления] + Завершение Речевого События», которая предполагает актуализацию определённых компонентов семантики предложения.

Ключевые слова: интенция говорящего, деинтенсификация, модальная рамка, матрица, дискурс.

DISCUSSION & ASSUMPTIONS. Within some decades, the study of discourse markers or discourse particles have been in the focus of discourse-analysis. Their functions in discourse structure used to bear various labels: discourse markers (Schiffrin, 1987; Urgelles-Coll, 2010) discourse connectives (Blakemore, 1992), discourse operators, linguistic markers of (Redeker, 2006), discourse particles (Schorup, 1985), discourse signaling devices (Polanyi and Scha, 1983), phatic connectives (Bazanella, 1990), pragmatic connectives (van Dijk, 1979; Stubbs, 1983), pragmatic expressions (Erman, 1992), pragmatic formatives (Fraser, 1987), pragmatic markers (Fraser, 1988, 1990; Schiffrin, 2012), pragmatic operators, pragmatic particles (Ostman, 1995), semantic conjuncts (Quirk et al., 1985), sentence connectives. Bruce Fraser admits that this array of nominations reveals different approaches to one and the same object detailing its polifunctionality [9, p.932]. And, of course, new terms come into use aimed at grouping units into a common classification by a variety of linguistic schools or trends. According to R. Sperber and R. Wilson's opinion, communicative intention of the speaker is to inform the addressee [29, p.61; 33, p. 583–185]. This view gives a clue of a possible semantic transition of the unit from communicative intention [see intention/intentionality: 17, p.231–232] to mental act with the purpose of informing the addressee. Evidentially, due to the lexical-grammatical similarity of the phrase «I think» and overlapping of intention and information the primary semantic component of the phrase is «speech event», i.e. «I say [to you]», whereas the component of intention «I inform [you]» takes the secondary position. We can see that such shift may cause the appearance of different types of inference underlying the speaker's meaning.

We have selected a specific construct «I think» which the school grammar can term as a predicate phrase, the text grammar – embedded sentence, the semantic grammar – modal frame [cf.: 14, p. 237 fl.], the speech act theory – an informative matrix, the discourse-analysis – a particle/connector/connective/conjunct, the functional semantics – a complex unit revealing a taxonomy of functions. We shall start with its intentional function [9, p. 932; 8, p. 157–169; 7, p. 15–17]. Lawrence C. Schourup in his book describes several items in English conversation forming a certain group represented by interjections (oh, hey, aha), particles (yes, yeah, well), adverbs (well, now, then) 'pseudo-sentences' (you know, you see, I mean, I think) constitute a group of fillers in conversation [27]. At least here comes a classification including units of different grammatical status though its principles depend mainly upon the authors.

Our assumption is that there is a group of markers or operators of intentionality [see intention-based grammar: 25] belonging to various language levels which can reveal the following functional-semantic components in specific contexts to express the author's meaning: «I say (constative) → I inform → I express (deontic modality) → I intend (hedge or soft downtoner, or deintensifier)». We can reformulate the given chain of transformation into a series of semantic components: utterance::information::modal charge::intention. This formula organizes the components into a taxonomy describing the generative approach – from the speaker's point. If we go backward we can have the interpretative approach – from the addressee's point where on the top position must be «intention» [see also: 18, p. 15 fl.; 28, p. 141]. K. Bach and R. Harnish introduced a complicated term of «illocutionary-communicative intention» which may be decoded as the so-called communicative presumption: an assumption that when the speaker utters something to the addressee, the speaker is doing so with an illocutionary intention [1, p. 7]. When analyzing the meaning of an utterance P.H. Grice distinguishes between the surface meaning: «what the speaker literally says when using them, and on the deep level: what the speaker means or intends to communicate by using those words. As for P.H. Grice's deep level we may decompose it into three layers (see: the semantic formula)» [11, p. 107–114].

OBJECTIVES & INVESTIGATION. The corpus analysis is based on «a 100 million word collection of samples of written and spoken language from a wide range of sources, designed to represent a wide cross-section of British English from the late twentieth century». The BNC gives the following data of the frequency of «I think...» – the total use is 40971; the highest frequency is registered in the Spoken Register—25825; the lowest is in the Academic Register – 845; in Fiction –7006; in Newspaper – 1743; in Magazine – 1536; Non-academic –1242; and in Miscellaneous --

2773. We have selected 26 text fragments with the «attitudinal» frame «I think...» expressing an additional component of hedging and grouped them according to its position in the utterance: front, middle and final positions.

Due to the theory of lexical semantics the verb *think* is chosen as the dominant lexeme of the semantic field «mental event». In the English Lexicon the verb *think*, with the nucleus component *to form or have in the mind* demonstrates seven peripheries in its semantic structure as transitive: (1) to have as an intention; (2) *thought* to return early; to have as an opinion; think it's so; to regard as (consider); think the rule unfair; (3) to reflect on (ponder); think the matter over; to determine by reflecting; *think* what to do next; (4) to call to mind (remember); (5) to devise by **thinking** – usually used with *up*; *thought* up a plan to escape; (6) to have as an expectation (anticipate); (7) to center one's thoughts on; talks and thinks business; (8) to form a mental picture of; to subject to the processes of logical thought; think things out; and five peripheries in its semantic structure as intransitive: (1) to exercise the powers of judgment, conception, or inference (reason); to have in the mind or call to mind a thought; (2) to have the mind engaged in reflection (MEDITATE); to consider the suitability; *thought* of her for president; (3) to have a view or opinion; thinks of oneself as a; (4) to have concern – usually used with *of*; (5) to consider something likely (suspect).

The semantic domain of verbs sharing a common component “an act of thinking” in their lexical meaning is based on the data of the definitional (dictionary entries) and the componential types of analysis integrating the following constituents: accept, allow, assume, believe, cogitate, conclude, conceive, consider, deduce, deem, deliberate (slow or careful reasoning before forming an opinion or reaching a conclusion or decision), depend, envisage, envision, esteem, fancy, feel, figure, guess, hold, imagine, judge, perceive, presume, presuppose, reckon, regard, reason, reflect, rely, speculate, suppose, surmise, trust, view. The discourse-analysis reveals the semantic component deliberate «slow or careful reasoning before forming an opinion or reaching a conclusion or decision» in the semantic structure of the mental verb *think* actualized in the Spoken Register. We managed to correlate the meaning of the phrase with the situation in a definite context (situation). The both domains can overlap each other in discourse while in the Lexical system they can exist separately. Then we shall investigate the semantic components in the verb lexical meaning functioning in the phrase «I think».

The theory of language communication describes communication as speech acts which produce communicative intention [30, p. 107–114] which is one of the phenomena helping hearers to recognize the meaning of an utterance [16, p. 42]; what someone says is determined by the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered and contextual processes of disambiguation and reference fixing [10, p. 107–114]. In the following text fragments we shall try to reveal the correlation of the meaning of phrase «I think» and the speaker's intentional meaning. First comes the phrase in the initial position.

A. I THINK –INITIAL POSITION AS A SENTENCE OPENER

1. This sort of algorithm might be the way to do it. **I think** there are a few others but not many.

2. *It's East Herts isn't it? I think.* (pause) *Was it East Herts?*

3. **I think** it's possible to make a bit of money but at the rate.

4. **I think**, I've a funny feeling that (unclear) did (unclear) adopt it.

The phrase imposes the speaker's meaning of doubt or indecision upon the hearer giving him/her no choice of interpreting it oneself. The phrase in the initial position (Group A) does not need any support of other discourse markers.

B. DISCOURSE PARTICLE +I THINK (IN THE POSTPOSITION)

NO + I THINK

6. *Can you hear alright? No, no, I think they can hear alright. It's (unclear) necessary for you to stand.*

YEAH + I THINK

7. *Yeah, I think, I haven't got details of that,..* Yeah as an adverb “yes”: is used to express affirmation or assent or to mark the addition of something emphasizing and amplifying a previous

statement);(2)to express an emphatic contradiction of a previously negative statement or command; (3) to express hesitation, curiosity, uncertainty, etc.; (4) to express hesitation, uncertainty, curiosity, etc.; (5)to express polite or minimal interest or attention.

SO + I THINK

8. **Now the Congress is held in Glasgow, so I think we weren't going to that one anyway, to say how, how they tackled it.**

Anyway is used as a discourse marker, adverbial or propositional meaning use [32, p. 1-3].

9. *So I think it should an interesting meeting, hopefully we'll get a few, you know.*

SO: *adverb* (1)to such a great extent; (2) to the same extent (used in comparisons); (3) to refer back to something that has just been mentioned; (4) to introduce the next event in a series of events or to a connection between two events; (5) to introduce a new topic, or to introduce a question or comment about something that has been said. Conjunction (1) and for this reason; therefore; (2) with the aim that; in order that.

EH/ER + I THINK

10. *People are in the same position, they will be putting in eh, I think they just call it best of interest, not a proper application.*

11. *Because it also brings us in money. Er, I think that's very dodgy.*

12. *I talked about in the last lecture er I think it was the last lecture but one.*

Er, interjection:(1) used as a regular pause filler to express or represent a pause, hesitation, uncertainty, etc.; *erm*, interjection: (1) word used commonly to fill awkward space in conversations; (2) awkward space filler used in tense or boring conversations; (3) A word used whenever one feels insecure or unsure about a situation, person or place in order to create a more comfortable atmosphere.

WELL + I THINK

13. *Well I think Boy's High (pause) were active in between weren't they?*

14. *Well, what I think I shall do now is I think I should take this a little further.*

15. *Well I think we can arrange to pick you up as we go (unclear) at that time.*

Well, interjection: (1) used to show that you are unsure about something you are saying; (2) used to show that you accept something even though you are not happy about it; (3) when you are trying to persuade someone or to make someone feel less upset, worried, etc.; (4) used when you are saying in a mild way that you disapprove of or disagree with something “*Well*, I still think my way is better”. (5) used to show that you are waiting for someone to say or do something; (6) used to say that something has ended or to make a final statement about something; (7) used to begin a story or explanation or to continue one that was interrupted; (8) said to express happiness or relief; (9) used to express surprise or annoyance; (10) used when you want to correct a previous statement. The first use is the most popular among the English speakers just to buy time while considering the next step. As a discourse marker it is synonymous with *anyway* [32, p. 15–16].

BECAUSE + I THINK

16. *And then I just thought I'd finally conclude a bright, cos I think it, it's like (unclear) how I see myself at work.*

Because is ambiguous and may function as conjunction and discourse marker. [32, p. 19].

WELL + I THINK

17. *Well I think the ideas should come from the members, well what do they think about it.*

18. *Though we've got to pursue with leisure, well I think as part of this front line review we've got to, you know.*

The additional unit *you know* as phrase filler is used by the speaker when s/he is hesitating a bit while thinking on how to explain.

BUT + I THINK

19. *Say we don't need to many but I think we can take a few and we will take our petition with us.*

But, a contrastive conjunction: (1) on the contrary; yet; (2) except; save; (3) unless; if not; except that (followed by a clause, often with *that* expressed); (4) without the circumstance that; (5)

otherwise than; (5) used especially after *doubt, deny*, etc., with a negative. It also co-occurs with the phrase «I think» denoting the speaker's uncertainty; (6) who not; that not; preposition; (1) with the exception of; except; save.

AND + I THINK

20. *We've got not X one not X two not X three and I think on your examples you've actually got them labeled.*

The conjunction *and* can occur with the «I think» to underline uncertainty or hesitation.

Okay+ I THINK

21. *Okay I think you've got a corrected slide here.*

22. *Which is nice. Okay I think you've got a corrected slide here. Erm this is my attempt.*

Okay, adverb: (1) *all right; well enough; successfully; fine*; (2) (used as an affirmative response) *yes; surely*. Interjection: (1) (used to express agreement, understanding, acceptance, or the like); (2) used as an introductory or transitional expletive. It can be normally uses as affirmation but in our case it used as a hesitation filler. The phrase «I think» requires the support of the initial discourse marker to win the time for the speaker to think over the next step.

C.TWO PARTICLES + I THINK IN THE (POSTPOSITION)

YEAH + WELL (I MEAN) +I THINK

23. *Sixth is the Friday. Yeah, well I mean I think we need to get as many as possible.*

Two discourse markers underline a high level of speaker's hesitation/uncertainty.

D. MIDPOSITION BETWEEN DISCORSE PARTICLES

WELL + I THINK +ER

24. *Well I think that er, you know, just didn't (unclear) happen like that though.*

Well can also mean that the author is not sure to give an answer [23, p.56 fl.].

BUT+ I THINK +ERM

25. *But I think erm Ron has and also the fact that we've taken (unclear) remarks.*

The phrase «I think» is used between two discourse markers.

NOW + I THINK +ER

26. *Now I think, er and I'm sure that Mrs...*

Generally *now* belongs to the class of adverbs though in this case is used a discourse marker and a traditional interjection strengthens the speaker's uncertainty

Most discourse markers are the result of grammatical transition from the notional part of speech into the functional alongside with original interjections and conjunctions which employed as discourse particle in the Spoken Register. The discourse markers are polifunctional that makes their integration into different processes to create discourse coherent [32, p. 29]. Nevertheless, in the present research all the units under study reveal the nucleus functional component in the contexts.

According to Sperberg and Wilson (1986) the speaker's intention may well be «overt» even though it is neither reflexive nor embedded in infinite series of meta-intentions, primarily, in Group A and in Groups B–D as well. Recanati Francois underlines that overtness of the speaker's intention is expressed by the modal frame and supported mostly by adverbs (now, well, okay, yeah), conjunctions (but, if), particles and interjections (er/erm) [22, p. 199]. Accordingly, hedge is a marker of uncertainty in language or approximation. A hedge signals the information as unreliable or approximate. A. Jucker et al. stress that in spoken and spontaneous stories hedges (such as maybe, I think, and I dunno) point to unreliability, approximation and at the same time enhancing the hearer's intellectual activity [13, p. 1-12]. In Groups B-D they support the speaker's uncertainty and hesitation.

The achievement of decoding the speaker's intention was gained due to employing the correlation of Lexical and Functional Semantics and the assumption that the hearer recognizes this intention based on the speaker and hearer's «mutual knowledge» [see: 5]. To define overtness the notion of «mutual knowledge» was introduced by Steven Schiffer (1972) [see also: 15, p. 1–5]. The speaker's knowledge involves constructing a model of the hearer's knowledge relevant to the given

situational context; conversely, the hearer's knowledge includes constructing a model of the speaker's knowledge relevant to the given situational context.

CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES. To summarize, we have defined the phrase «I think» in the Spoken discourse from the interpretative point as: a hedge, a modal frame, the [speaker's] intention, an information bit and communication. The semantic component "hedge" of the given phrase actualized in a definite context is a marker of the speaker's intention, combined with specific discourse operators supporting the meaning of hedges drawn from conjunctions, adverbs, particles and interjections.

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